THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT - A LEGAL OVERVIEW
CYNTHIA

I.

E. Grrr*

INTRODUCTION

In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(Title VII),1 a broad statute prohibiting discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. A new agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), was created to oversee enforcement of this
statute.
Three years later Congress passed the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 2 to prohibit discrimination in employment because of age with respect to persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five. Administration and enforcement of this statute was consigned to the Department of
Labor (DOL), which already enforced the Fair Labor Standards Act 3 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.'
Prompted by experience under the age discrimination act
and by a decision of the United States Supreme Court 5 which
interpreted the ADEA to permit involuntary retirement of
employees under sixty-five years of age if pursuant to a bona
fide employment plan, Congress amended the ADEA in 1978.
This article reviews those amendments to the ADEA as well
as other recent developments under that Act.
The 1978 amendments made significant changes in the
structure of the ADEA. Some of these amendments have complex ramifications with respect to both current law and current employment practices. These amendments, and the legal
* B.A., Wheaton College, 1968; J.D., George Washington University Law School,
1971. Ms. Gitt is an associate in the firm of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, Los Angeles,
California.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
5. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
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issues which they create, are more easily understood when
considered in their procedural or substantive setting.
II.

PROCEDURAL AMENDMENTS

A. Prerequisitesfor Suit
When first enacted, the ADEA was procedurally a hybrid
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. By virtue of the 1978 amendments, however, the procedural prerequisites for suit under the ADEA
now more closely parallel the Title VII prerequisites. This is
an appropriate change since the authority to enforce the
ADEA was transferred from the DOL to the EEOC on July 1,
1979, pursuant to governmental reorganization by President
Carter.' Significantly, however, there are instances in which
the legislative commentary on the amendments suggests that
Congress did not necessarily intend that judicial interpretation of Title VII procedures should apply to similar procedures under the ADEA.
1. The Charge Requirement
Prior to the 1978 amendments, the ADEA, like Title VII,
authorized suits by individual litigants. However, unlike Title
VII, the ADEA required that an individual affirmatively preserve this right to bring suit by first filing "a notice of intent
to sue" with the Secretary of Labor (Secretary). This notice
had to be filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged
discrimatory practice, or within 300 days of that date in those
states with laws prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and authorizing a state agency to grant or seek
relief from such discriminatory practices. The Secretary was
then directed to attempt to eliminate any discriminatory
practices through conciliation. An individual litigant could
nevertheless fie suit in federal court within sixty days after
filing his notice with the Secretary.
This notice of intent to sue requirement frequently created
a problem for the unwary lay person. Several courts held that
a general charge of discrimination filed with the Secretary did
not satisfy this requirement. Instead, an individual had to file,
6. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978) (effective July 1,
1979).
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within the stated time limitations, a document which specifically stated his or her intent to sue on the basis of the alleged
discrimination. Otherwise, suit would be barred for failure to
comply with the notice requirement.7 Furthermore, the filing
requirement often was deemed to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, so that late filing could not be excused on equitable
grounds." It was not uncommon for an individual to file a general statement of discrimination with the Secretary and to
later learn, after the Secretary had unsuccessfully attempted
conciliation, that he had lost his right to bring an action in his
own name because of his failure to fie a notice of intent to
sue within the prescribed time period.
This hurdle has been substantially eliminated by the 1978
amendments. The notice of intent to sue requirement has
been deleted. Now, consistent with Title VII, an aggrieved individual must simply file a "charge" with the EEOC9 within
180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination, or within
300 days of that date in those states in which a state authority
has been created to grant or seek relief from age discrimination, to preserve the right to bring suit as an individual
litigant.
Moreover, the Report of the House and Senate Joint Conference Committee 10 (Conference Committee Report) on the
amendments states that the charge requirement is to be
deemed satisfied by a written statement identifying the potential defendants and generally describing the action believed to
be discriminatory." Thus, the ADEA now has virtually the
same charge requirements as Title VII.

7. See, e.g., Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Powell v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, Hageman v. Philips
Roxane Laboratories Inc., 623 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
8. See, e.g., Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. 1I 1979). Before July 1, 1979, charges had to be filed
with the Secretary of Labor within the relevant time periods. As noted above, the
EEOC has taken over the functions of the Secretary of Labor pursuant to reorganization of some of the agencies comprising the executive branch of government. See note
6 supra.
10. H. CoNF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 528 [hereinafter cited as CoNF. Comm. REP.].
11. Id. at 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 534.
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Prior Filing with State Agencies

Initially, the most important procedural problem under
the ADEA left unanswered by the 1978 amendments was
whether, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an ADEA
suit, a litigant must first seek state relief in those states having laws prohibiting discrimination in employment because of
age and establishing a state authority to grant or seek relief
from such discrimination. Section 14(b) of the ADEA 12 creates
the issue. It provides that in such a state, "no suit may be
brought under section 622 of this title [section 7 of the Act]
before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been
3
commenced under the State law . ...
Prior to the 1978 amendments, courts split on the question
whether section 14(b) required that a charge be filed with a
state agency as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an ADEA
suit. Section 14(b) was not affected by the 1978 amendments.
The only reference to this question appears in the discussion
in the Conference Committee Report of the amendment of the
notice of intent to sue requirement. There, with reference to
the 300-day limitation for filing in states covered by section
14(b), the Committee stated that it adopted the discussion of
the state deferral procedures appearing in the Senate Committee Report."' The Senate had taken the position in the report of its Human Resources Committee (Senate Report) that
a litigant need not initially file with a state agency.1 5 Rather,

12. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
13. Section 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976), reads:
(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occuring in a State which has a

law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing
or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title [section 7
of the Act] before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated .... If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings

is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the filing of a
written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based,
the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of
this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
appropriate State authority.
14. CoNE. Comm.REP., supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 534.
15. S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 508-10.
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the Senate would give the individual litigant the option of
filing his claim with either the state agency or with the Secretary of Labor. If the individual filed his claim with the state
agency, however, he would have to allow that agency at least
sixty days in which to take remedial action before he could
commence an ADEA suit.
Despite the views of the Senate and Conference Committees, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held in Oscar
Mayer and Co. v. Evans16 that under section 14(b) of the
ADEA, resort to administrative remedies by litigants in states
with agencies empowered to remedy age discrimination in employment is mandatory, not optional. Federal suit may not be
brought under the ADEA 17 unless the claimant has first commenced a proceeding with the appropriate state agency.
In so holding, the Court noted that the language of section
14(b) is, with one important exception discussed below, virtually in haec verba as section 706(c) of Title VII.' 8 Section
706(c) had been held to require individuals in deferral states,
that is, states with agencies empowered to remedy age discrimination in employment, to resort to appropriate state proceedings before filing charges with the EEOC or before filing
suit under Title VII. 9 This similarity in language and the legislative citation of section 706(c) as the source of section
14(b) 20 led the Court to conclude that Congress intended the
construction of section 14(b) to follow that of section 706(c).
The Court found further support for this conclusion in the
16. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
17. Authority to commence an action in federal district court is authorized by
section 7(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)- (1976).
18. Section 706(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occuring in a State,
or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting
the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated . ...
19. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co.,
511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 100 S. Ct. 2486

(1980).
20. 441 U.S. at 755-56.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:607

common purpose of the two statutes, namely, elimination of
discrimination in the workplace. 2 '
Section 14(b) does permit simultaneous filing of a claim
with state and federal agencies, while section 706(c) requires
that a charge be filed with the state agency before it is filed
with the EEOC.2 2 In spite of this variation, the Court in Oscar
Mayer rejected the argument that this difference disclosed
legislative intent to make filing with the state agency optional
under section 14(b). The Court found instead that this difference merely reflected an acknowledgement of the importance
of speed in processing the claims of older citizens.23
The Court also rejected the argument that the supercassion of all state proceedings when an action under the ADEA
is commenced, 4 another ADEA provision absent from Title
VII, makes resort to the state an exercise in futility since
claimants may, after only sixty. days, abort their involuntary
state proceedings by filing a federal suit. The Court held that
state agencies must be given at least some opportunity to resolve problems of age discrimination and noted that the ade25
quacy of the sixty-day limit was a decision for Congress.
The Oscar Mayer decision obviously conflicts with the
view stated in the 1978 Conference Committee Report that resort to state remedies should be optional under section 14(b).
However, the Court has often held that legislative views regarding the meaning of a statute enacted in a previous session
are not helpful in construing the intent of the Congress actu-

21. Id. at 756.
22. Section 7(d) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. III 1979), provides that a
charge may be filed: "(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title [section 14(b)
of the Act] applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or
within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings
under State law, whichever is earlier."
As noted before, section 706(c) of Title VII permits a charge to be filed with the
EEOC only after the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under state law, unless such proceedings were earlier terminated.

23. 441 U.S. at 756-57.
24. Section 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976), provides in pertinent part: "Nothing
in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like
functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age ex-

cept that upon commencement of action under this chapter such action shall supersede any State action." Title VII has no counterpart to this provision.
25. 441 U.S. at 757.
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ally enacting the statute.2" Thus, the Court in Oscar Mayer

noted that the Commmittee's 1978 statements were insufficient to overcome the clear and convincing evidence that, in
1967, Congress intended that section 14(b) of the ADEA
should have the same meaning as section 706(c) of Title V]117
3. Timeliness of Filing Charges
a. State Proceedings
Oscar Mayer also established that a litigant need not commence state proceedings within the time limits specified by
state law to satisfy this prerequisite to an ADEA suit.2 8 The

Court reasoned that by its terms section 14(b)2 9 requires only
that state proceedings be "commenced" sixty days before federal litigation is instituted and that, by analogy to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a proceeding could be commenced
by filing a complaint even if time-barred.30 The Court also
found direct confirmation of this analysis in the final sentence
of section 14(b), which provides:
If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding
shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes
of this subsection at the time such statement is 3sent by registered mail to the appropriate State authority. '

Thus, a state proceeding will be deemed commenced for purposes of section 14(b) at the time the complaint is filed, since
state limitations periods are requirements "other than" that
of filing a charge and thus fall within the express language of
the statute. 2
26. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977)
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part of the
legislative history."); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) ("Itis
the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] that controls.").
27. 441 U.S. at 758.
28. Id. at 758-64. The Court sharply divided on this issue, with the four dissenters
characterizing the majority opinion as "advisory." Id. at 767.
29. See text of the relevant portion of section 14(b) at note 13 supra.
30. 441 U.S. at 759.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976). Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1976), contains a similar provision.
32. 441 U.S. at 760, 764.
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Moreover, the Court thought that this reasoning was consistent with prevailing authority interpreting section 14(b) of
the ADEA and its Title VII counterpart, section 706(c), with
the remedial purpose of the ADEA, and with the objective of
section 14(b) to furnish state agencies a limited opportunity
to settle claims of age discrimination in a voluntary and localized manner 3 The Court also held that Congress could not
have intended by implication to add to the explicit limitations
periods contained elsewhere in the ADEA, s4 particularly in
view of the fact that there could result a shorter limitations
period in some deferral states than the 180-day period allowed
in non-deferral states. 5
As a result of Oscar Mayer, ADEA litigants in deferral
states must file a charge with the appropriate agency in their
state, but may do so either before or after filing a charge with
the EEOC.3 6 Court actions commenced without filing state
charges should be held in abeyance until the mandate of sec37
tion 14(b) has been fulfilled.
A conflict between the courts of appeals has developed in
the wake of Oscar Mayer on the issue of whether the 180-day
or the 300-day limitations period of section 7(d)38 of the

33. Id. at 760-61 and cases cited therein.
34. The Court found that the ADEA's limitations periods are set forth in section
7(d) and (e), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) and (e) (Supp. III 1979). The text of section 626(d) is
set forth in note 38 infra. Section 626(e) incorporates the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255 and 259 (1976) (two years, or
three years for willful violations).
35. 441 U.S. at 763-64.
36. Id. at 756 n.4.
37. Id. at 764-65 n.13. The Court found suspension of proceedings in order to
permit compliance with section 14(b) preferable to dismissal with leave to refile, as
the latter would constitute a needless procedural technicality.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. III 1979). That section provides:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60
days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the
Commission. Such a charge shall be filed (1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after
receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under
State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving such a charge, the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons
named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall
promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods
of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
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ADEA governs the filing of charges with state agencies.
In Ciccone v. Textron, Inc.,3 9 the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit held that charges must be filed with the state
agency within 180 days in order for a litigant to avail himself
of the 300-day period within which to file federal charges. The
court reasoned that the purpose of the extended filing period,
to afford litigants a grace period within which to pursue state
remedies, would not be served by providing a 120-day "windfall" to litigants in deferral states who had not actually pursued their state remedies. The Third" and Sixth 41 Circuits

had adopted similar rules prior to the Oscar Mayer decision.
The rationale of Ciccone has been greatly discredited by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 42 an action arising under Title VII. That decision established that section 706(c)(3) of Title VII does not require a

complainant in a deferral state to fie a timely charge with the
state agency within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory

practice in order to take advantage of the extended period to
fie with the EEOC. Under Title VII, a complainant in a

deferral state may file a charge with the EEOC within 240
days of the alleged discriminatory act without having fied any
charge with the deferral state's enforcing agency. The Court
arrived at this 240-day requirement by reading the requirement of section 706(e),' 3 that charges be filed with the EEOC

within 300 days of the alleged act, in light of the section
706(c) requirement that charges be fied with a state or local
39. 616 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir.), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
40. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978).
41. Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 908 (1979).
42. 100 S. Ct. 2486 (1980).
43. Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that in a
case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall
be fied by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days
after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier.
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agency prior to filing with the EEOC. 44
The rationale of Mohasco appears equally applicable to
section 7(d) of the ADEA, the close counterpart of section
706(e) of Title VII. However, the ADEA permits simultaneous
filing of the charge with state and federal agencies, unlike section 706(c) of Title VII, which requires sequential filing. Because of this difference, complainants under the ADEA should
have the full 300 days rather than 240 days to file with EEOC.
Two courts of appeals have reached results consistent with
Mohasco. The Third Circuit in Davis v. Calgon Corp."5 cited
Mohasco and Oscar Mayer as authority for its conclusion that
a complainant's failure to fie a charge with the state agency
within the state's 90-day limitation period or within the
ADEA's 180-day time limit for filing a charge with the federal
agency in a non-deferral state did not preclude him from filing
a federal charge 223 days after the alleged discriminatory act.
The Ninth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion prior to
the Mohasco decision in Bean v. Crocker National Bank,46 relying upon the express language of section 7(d)(2) and upon
the Oscar Mayer holding that the filing of state charges need
not be timely made under state law to fulfill the prerequisite
of section 7(d). 47 The court reasoned that this holding implied
that the 300-day limitations period of section 7(d)(2) should
govern the filing of charges with the federal administrative
agency regardless of the timeliness of the state charges. 48
b. Charges Filed with the EEOC
Still unresolved by the 1978 amendments and subsequent
case law is the question whether the time limits established in
section 7(d) of the ADEA for filing charges are jurisdictional
prerequisites to be strictly enforced or statutes of limitations
subject to equitable modification. In the report accompanying
the 1978 amendment to section 7(d), 49 the Conference Com-

44. 100 S. Ct. at 2490 n.16. For text of section 706(c) see note 18 supra.
45. 627 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1980) (U.S. Supreme Court Appeal pending).
46. 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
47. Id. at 758.
48. Id. at 758-59.
49. As discussed at note 9 supra, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) was amended to require that
a charge rather than a notice of intent to sue be filed prior to commencing a civil
action.
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mittee stated that the time limits for filing charges are to be
viewed as statutes of limitations subject to equitable modification rather than as jurisdictional prerequisites. 50 The Committee cited with approval cases 51 suggesting that untimely filing
of charges is excusable when the plaintiff can establish that
late filing resulted from his ignorance of the requirements of
the ADEA because of the employer's failure to post the notice
required by the ADEA 523 or because of misinformation re5
ceived from an attorney.
The three courts of appeals which have decided this issue
since the 1978 amendments have ruled that the ADEA time
limits are subject to equitable modifications.5 All three courts
cited the Conference Committee Report to support their holdings but also placed reliance on the rationale of earlier decisions55 which stressed the remedial purpose of the ADEA.
Two other courts of appeals have left the issue open.56 The
remaining appellate courts have not yet addressed the question. Several district courts have addressed the issue with conflicting results.57
50. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 12, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 534.
51. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556
F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
52. Section 8 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976), provides: "Every employer,
employment agency, and labor organization shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by the Secretary
setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter."
53. CONF. COMM. RE., supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 534.
54. Wright v. Tennessee, 628 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Coke v. General
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 616 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1980); Kephart v. Institute of Gas
Technology, 581 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1978).
55. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978); Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), afi'd by an
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), cited with approval in CONF. COMM. REP.,
supra note 10, at 12-13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 534.
56. Larson v. American Wheel and Brake, Inc., 610 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1979); Reich
v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Potter v. Continental Trailways, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo.
1979) (notice requirement subject to equitable modification, relying in part on Conference Committee Report); Coyle v. Spigner, 477 F. Supp. 23 (D.S.C. 1979) (requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to suit); Fulton v. NCR Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 377 (W.D. Va. 1979) (congressional interpretation of 1978 amendments deemed
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The decisions holding that the ADEA time limits are subject to equitable modification can be viewed as inconsistent
with decisions characterizing the almost identical time requirements in Title VII 55 as a jurisdictional prerequisite5 to

bringing a discrimination suit.6 0 However, several recent Title
VII cases reflect a recognition by courts that, in certain circumstances, equitable considerations can toll these statutory
time periods regardless of how they are characterized., Generally, courts have tolled Title VII time limits in situations
where a claimant lacked knowledge of necessary facts because
of concealment by the employer or the investigating agency,
or where a claimant lacked such knowledge because of misinformation disseminated by the employer or the investigating
agency.2
Similarly, courts have tolled the ADEA time limits where
the employer was responsible for the delay,63 where the claimant was unaware of the facts that would give rise to his cause
of action' and where the claimant was misled as to the requirements of timely filing by the investigating agency.6 5
controlling); Franci v. Avco Corp., 460 F. Supp. 389 (D. Conn. 1978) (Conference
Committee Report cited but amendments not applicable to action); Jackson v. Alcan
Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (amendments noted but time limit
not tolled because delay not caused by the defendant's conduct).
58. See section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
59. A second "jurisdictional prerequisite" to bringing a Title VII suit is the filing
of the suit within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter as provided in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f) (1976).
60. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 (1977); Electrical
Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569
F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Smith v. OEO for Ark., 538 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.
1976):
61. See, e.g., Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979);
Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979); Hart v. J.T. Baker
Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979); Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
62. See, e.g., Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979); Reeb
v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Cottrell v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1979) (time limits not tolled while
awaiting findings of state agency).
63. See, e.g., Potter v. Continental Trailways, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo.
1979) (failure to file caused by employer's holding out hopes of reemployment).
64. See, e.g., Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
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Courts also have tolled the time limits where the employer
has failed to post conspicuously the notice required by section
886 of the ADEA.67 Where such factors have not been present,
tolling of the time limitations has been refused. 8
4. Conciliation
Before the 1978 amendments, the ADEA, like Title VII,
permitted suits to be brought by the government, with the
DOL fulfilling the role played by the EEOC under Title VII.
As is the case under Title VII, the ADEA required the Secretary to attempt to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practices through conciliation before implementing suit. However,
unlike Title VII, which has no specific statute of limitations
governing suits by the EEOC, the ADEA required the Secretary to file suit within two years of the challenged practice, or
within three years of the challenged practice if it constituted a
willful violation of the Act.8 9
Several problems resulted from this requirement. For example, when conciliation discussions were delayed or protracted, the Secretary often would have to file suit before attempting or completing conciliation in order to avoid being
barred by the statute of limitations. Employers could then argue, often successfully, that conciliation was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the Secretary's suit and, therefore, that the
suit should be dismissed for failure to conciliate. 0
To remedy this problem, the 1978 amendments provide
that the statute of limitations on a suit brought by the Secretary shall be tolled for one year while the Secretary attempts
conciliation.71 The Conference Committee stated that the toll66. See note 52 supra.
67. See, e.g., Wright v. Tennessee, 628 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Kephart
v. Institute of Gas Technology, 581 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1978); Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate Co., 462 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y.

1978). A similar result has been reached in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Chappell v.
Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979).
69. Section 7(e)(1) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979), incorpo-

rates the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 255, 259 (1976).
70. See, e.g., Usery v. Sun Oil Co. (DeL), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976);
Dunlop v. Resource Sciences Corp., 410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976).

71. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2)(Supp. 1I 1979).
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ing should begin when the DOL states in a letter to the prospective defendants that it is prepared to commence
conciliation. 2
The Conference Committee also stated in its report that
conciliation is not to be deemed a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a suit by the Secretary, 3 citing with approval the decision
of the Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Ace Hardware Co.7 4 In
Ace Hardware the court affirmed the dismissal of the Secretary's suit because he failed to undertake any conciliation efforts. The court noted, however, that the district court, in its
discretion, could stay the proceeding pending conciliation efforts, rather than dismiss the action.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and one district
court have specifically relied upon the Committee's statement
in ordering that suits be stayed rather than dismissed when
the Secretary failed to satisfy the statutory conciliation requirement. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and
other courts have held that while fulfillment of the conciliation requirement is a condition precedent to the maintenance
of an ADEA action, dismissal is too drastic a sanction for less
than strict compliance.76 These results were reached without
reliance on the legislative history of the 1978 amendments.
The Conference Committee's reference to Ace Hardwareis
significant in another respect. The Committee noted that Ace
Hardware "reflected a proper understanding of the conciliation requirement. ' 7 7 It is significant, therefore, that in Ace
Hardwarethe court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss rather than stay the action. Presumably the
Conference Committee agreed with the court that dismissal of
72. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS at 534.
73. Id. at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 534.
74. 495 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1974).

75. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Newburg R-2 Sch. Dist., 469 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
76. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. of Pa., 592 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 400

U.S. 826 (1980); Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978). Contra,
Usery v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop v. Resource
Sciences Corp., 410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976).

77. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 534.

1981]

AGE DISCRIMINATION

an action for failure to attempt conciliation, rather than a stay
of the action, is sometimes justified.
Perhaps the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to dismiss an ADEA action because of conciliation errors
can be predicted by reference to Title VII, which contains an
analogous requirement. " ' Clearly, the EEOC has a statutory
duty to attempt conference, conciliation and persuasion prior
to initiating an action under Title VII, and failure to attempt
to meet that duty has resulted in dismissal of EEOC actions. "
On the other hand, a dismissal has been found to be too drastic a reaction by the court when the EEOC has in good faith
attempted conciliation but has not exhausted all possible avenues. 0 A similar result may obtain under the ADEA.
However, it should be noted that unlike Title VII, the

ADEA provides that an individual's right to sue is cut off once
the EEOC files suit."' This provision has led at least one court
to state in dictum that dismissal of a lawsuit because of a failure to attempt conciliation would unfairly terminate the
rights of the aggrieved because of events beyond his control.82
Adoption of this rationale would effectively preclude a court
from ever dismissing an ADEA action because of the EEOC's
failure to attempt good faith conciliation and would thereby
nullify the requirement of pre-suit conciliation. This rationale

would also require the courts and the EEOC to treat the same

78. Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976), requires the EEOC
to "endeavor to eliminate ... alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. .. "
However, unlike section 7(b) of the ADEA, which requires that such efforts be
made "upon receiving ...
a charge," section 706(b) of Title VII directs conciliation
efforts to be made after investigation and determination of whether there is reasonable cause to believe a charge is true.
79. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp.
237 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Container Corp. of America, 352 F. Supp. 262 (M.D.
Fla. 1972).
80. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. Radiator Specialty, 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1)(Supp. HI 1979) provides:
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Commission to enforce
the right of such employee under this chapter.
82. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979).
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conciliation requirement, imposed on the same agency, differently, depending upon whether an action was brought under
S
the ADEA or under Title VII.
B.

Jury Trial

Prior to the 1978 amendments, the ADEA was silent on
the question whether a litigant thereunder was entitled to a
jury trial. In Lorillard v. Pons," the United States Supreme
Court held that a jury trial could be demanded in an action
for lost wages under the ADEA. The Court left open, however,
the issue whether a jury trial was available in an action for
liquidated damages, which are also available under the
ADEA. s 6
As amended, the ADEA permits a jury trial on any issue of
fact in an action brought for recovery of amounts owing under
the Act regardless of whether equitable relief is sought."' The
amendment states that "a person" shall be entitled to a trial
by jury.87 Since entities and associations as well as natural
persons, whether plaintiffs or defendants, are persons under
the Act,"" it appears that any party may demand a jury trial
in any action brought under the ADEA in which damages are
sought.8 9 To date this amendment has been the subject of little litigation.9 0

83. This difference may be justified if the ADEA provision for conciliation upon
receipt of a charge and without any investigation into its merits suggests that conciliation efforts are less important to the structure of the ADEA than to that of Title
VII.
84. 434 U.S. 575 (1977).
85. See notes 93-95 infra and accompanying text.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
87. Id.
88. Section II(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)(1976), defines "person" as "one
or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations, business trust, legal representatives, or any organized group of persons."
89. This provision is substantially different from Title VII, which has consistently
been held to provide no right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979); Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.
1978) and cases cited therein; Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975)
and cases cited therein.
90. Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 600 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979); Slatin v. Stanford
Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Nakshian v. Claytor, 481 F. Supp.
159 (D.D.C. 1979) (permitting government employees to demand jury trial despite
seemingly contradictory language in section 15(c), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c), which was not
amended in 1978).
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C. Punitive Damages
Section 7(b)91 of the ADEA permits a litigant to bring suit
to recover "amounts owing." Section 7(b) incorporates the remedial scheme of sections 11(b), 16 and 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.2 Thus, "amounts owing" under section 7(b)
encompasses two categories of damages. First, it includes
items of pecuniary loss such as wages and fringe and other
job-related benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages.
The purpose of allowing recovery for liquidated damages is to
compensate the aggrieved for nonpecuniary losses.9 3 Liquidated damages are determined by statute to be an amount
equal to the aggrieved's pecuniary loss. 9 ' Under the ADEA,
liquidated damages are available only in instances of willful
violations of the Act.95
Prior to the 1978 amendments, a heavily litigated issue
was whether punitive damages were recoverable in an ADEA
suit. The Conference Committee Report makes it clear that
punitive damages are unavailable under the ADEA. In its discussion of the jury trial amendment, the Conference Committee made the following statement as to the availability of punitive damages:
The ADEA as amended by this Act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature. The conferees therefore agree to
permit a jury trial on the factual issues underlying a claim
for liquidated damages because the Supreme Court has
made clear that an award of liquidated damages under the
FLSA is not a penalty but rather is available in order to
provide full compensatory relief for losses that are too "obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." Overnight Motor TransportationCompany
v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).6
91. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)(1976).
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216, 217 (1976 & Supp. M 1979).
93. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(a) and (b) (Supp. 11 1979).
95. Title VII has no comparable damage provision. Rather, it provides for reinstatement and back pay. While Title VII, like the ADEA, has been construed as not
providing for punitive damages, it has no provision comparable to the ADEA's allowance of double recovery through liquidated damages in instances of willful violation.
96. CONF. COMM. REP., supranote 10, at 14, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 535.
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The Committee's clarifying statement now brings the ADEA
in line with the Equal Pay Act, which also incorporates the
FLSA damage provisions, and under which it has been held
97
that punitive damages are unavailable.
Since the 1978 amendments, several courts have relied on
the Committee's statement in holding that punitive damages
are unavailable to an ADEA plaintiff.9 8 However, one court
has allowed recovery of punitive damages, 99 relying upon the
ADEA's broad language regarding both relief100 and pur1 01
pose.
D.

Significant ProceduralQuestions Unresolved by the

1978 Amendments
A procedural issue not addressed and, therefore, left unresolved by the ADEA is whether damages for pain and suffering are recoverable under the Act. The courts have split on
the question whether damages for pain and suffering are recoverable under the ADEA, although the majority view is that
they are not. 102 Moreover, all of the courts of appeals that

97. See, e.g., Carter v. Marshall, 457 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1978).
98. See Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. InI. 1979); Brin v.
Bigsby & Kruthers, 19 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 415 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 590
(7th Cir. 1980); Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn.
1979); Riddle v. Getty Ref. and Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
99. Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980).
100. The court relied on the language in section 7(b) providing: "In any action
brought to enforce this Act the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriateto effectuate the purposes of this Act, including without limitation . . . ." (emphasis supplied by court). Id. at 543.
101. The court found that the congressional purpose as stated in section 2 of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976), and particularly its concern with the impact on morale of
age discrimination, could not be fulfilled if the only remedies available were reinstatement, promotion, back pay and possible double damages in cases of willful violation.
Id.
102. For cases finding damages for pain and suffering recoverable, see, e.g., Hassan v. Delta Ortho. Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Morton
v. Sheboygan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Bertrand v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 432 F.
Supp. 952 (1977). For cases reaching the opposite result, see, e.g., Friend v. Union
Dime Say., 24 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Newkirk v. General Elec.
Co., 20 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1588 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464
F. Supp. 945 (N.D. InI. 1979); Windfrey v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 467 F. Supp.
56 (D.C. Neb. 1979); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid, 442 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Wis.
1978); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 428 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. Mich.
1977); Fellows v. Medford Co., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977).
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have decided this issue have denied their recovery. 10 3
Unfortunately, neither the 1978 amendments nor the accompanying Conference Committee Report specifically addressed this issue. The only relevant reference appears in the
Conference Committee Report passage in which the Committee, relying on Overnight Motor Transportation Co., stated
that liquidated damages provide the full measure of compensatory relief for items which are too difficult to prove. 1 " As
damages for pain and suffering constitute compensatory damages, they would not be available under the ADEA if, as the
Conference Committee implies, compensatory recovery is limited to pecuniary and liquidated damages.
Since the enactment of the 1978 amendments, four district
courts have relied on the Conference Committee's statement
in holding that the ADEA does not permit recovery for pain
and suffering.10 5 Two other district courts have allowed recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering.10 6 In
their view, allowing recovery for pain and suffering under the
ADEA is consistent with the Act's broad provisions regarding
relief and the legislature's expressed concern with the psycho10 7
logical effects of age discrimination.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS

A.

Raising the Protected Age Limit from Sixty-Five to
Seventy
In addition to procedural changes, the 1978 amendments
also effected major substantive changes to the ADEA. The
first major substantive provision of the 1978 amendments to
be discussed will be section 12(a).108 By virtue of this section,
103. Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security Ins.
Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978).
104. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
105. See cases cited at note 98 supra.
106. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan v.
Delta Ortho. Medical Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
107. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc. of Tex., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Colo. 1980); Hassan
v. Delta Ortho. Medical Group, Inc.,476 F. Supp. 1063 n.1, 1064-65 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
108. Section 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. III 1979). In Kuhar v. GreensbergSalem School Dist., 616 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1980), this provision was held to be pro-
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the protected age group has been enlarged to include persons
between the ages of sixty-five and seventy. Moreover, in federal employment the upper age limit has been entirely
abolished.
However, Congress enacted two major exemptions to its
amendment raising the upper age limit in nonfederal employment. First, bona fide executives and high policymakers, who
are entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement
benefit of at least $27,000 per year, may be involuntarily retired at age sixty-five. Second, tenured employees of institutions of higher education also may be involuntarily retired at
age sixty-five. Due to their importance, each of these exemptions is considered in detail.
1.

The Bona Fide Executive/High Policymaker Exemption

The exemption for bona fide executives and high policymakers added by the 1978 amendments appears in sections
12(c)(1) and (2). These sections provide as follows:
(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit
compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65
years of age but not 70 years of age, and who, for the 2-year
period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona
fide executive or a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit sharing, savings, or
deferred compensation plan or any combination of such
plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals, in
aggregate, at least $27,000.
(2) In applying the retirement benefit test of paragraph
(1) of this subsection, if any such retirement is in a form
other than a straight life annuity (with no ancillary benefits), or if employees contribute to any such plan or make
rollover contributions, such benefit shall be adjusted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, so that
the benefit is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with
no ancillary benefits) under a plan to which employees do
not contribute and under which no rollover contributions
are made.109
spective only.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) and (2) (Supp. III 1979). To date, no reported decisions
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Clearly, this exemption applies only to employees who
have held qualifying positions for at least two years prior to
age sixty-five. The two-year requirement was added in conference to prevent an employer from circumventing the law by
appointing employees to executive or high policymaking positions shortly before their sixty-fifth birthday. 110
Furthermore, in calculating the annual retirement benefit
available to the employee, it is clear that certain benefits the
employee receives will be excluded. For example, amounts attributable to Social Security, employee contributions and contributions of prior employers must be excluded.
Moreover, to qualify for this exemption, the employee
must be a bona fide executive or a high policymaker. The
phrase "bona fide executive or high policymaking position"
was added in conference to clarify the class of employees covered by this exemption. The Conference Committee emphasized that an employee may not be subject to mandatory retirement solely because he meets the income retirement
test.' He must hold a bona fide executive or high policymaking position.
The Conference Committee stated that the definition of
"bona fide executive" included in the regulations' 1 2 implementing the FLSA should serve as a guideline for determining
which employees are covered by the section 12(c) exemption.113 However, the Committee further stated that, in contrast to the FLSA definition of a bona fide executive, which
has been interpreted expansively, the ADEA use of the definition should be narrowly construed. Thus, to fall within the
exemption, an employee must meet the specific criteria set
forth by the Conference Committee as well as the requirements of the FLSA regulations.
In its report, the Conference Committee provided the following additional criteria for determining which employees

have addressed this exemption.
110. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 9, reprintedin 11978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs at 530.
111. Id.

112. "Bona fide executive" is defined, for purposes of the FLSA, in 29 C.F.R. §
541.1 (1980).
113. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 9, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 530-31.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:607

are bona fide executives. First, the head of a significant and
substantial local or regional operation of a corporation is covered by the exemption, while the head of a minor branch,
warehouse or retail store is excluded. Second, individuals at
higher levels in the corporate organizational structure "who
possess comparable or greater levels of responsibility and authority as measured by established and recognized criteria"
are covered by the exemption. Third, the heads of major corporate departments or divisions whose duties are associated
with corporate headquarters operations such as finance, marketing or legal, are also within the exemption. Fourth, immediate subordinates of such division heads are covered if they
possess responsibility which is comparable to or greater than
that possessed by the head of a significant and substantial local operation meeting the first criterion above.114
The exclusion of employees in "high policymaking positions" was added by Congress to ensure that certain top level
employees who do not qualify as executives under this amendment would nevertheless fall outside the reach of section
12(a). This exemption from section 12(a) is limited to individuals who possess little or no line authority but who play significant roles in the development of corporate policy and who
effectively recommend the implementation of such policy. The
Conference Committee Report suggests as examples of high
policymakers who are not bona fide executives
the positions of
11 5
chief economist or chief research scientist.
After passage of the 1978 amendments, the DOL proposed
amendments to its interpretive bulletin on the ADEA 1 dealing with the executive and high policymaking position exemption. The EEOC, after taking over enforcement authority of
the ADEA from the DOL in July, 1979, subsequently adopted
and issued the finalized DOL interpretation of the executive
and high policymaking employee exemption. 17 The EEOC
sees this exemption as a narrow one, a view consistent with
the Conference Committee position. In light of this, the
114. Id. at 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 531.

115. Id.
116. The DOL's interpretive bulletin on the ADEA appears at 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.1.120 (1980). The DOL's proposed amendments appeared at 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264
(1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148 (1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 58,154 (1978).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (1980).
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EEOC regulations will place the burden on the party seeking
to invoke the exemption to show that every element has been
clearly and unmistakably met. 118
In defining the terms "bona fide executive" and "high policymaking position," the EEOC repeats the criteria set forth in
the Conference Committee Report discussed above. 11 9 The
regulations emphasize that the exemption does not apply to
middle-management employees regardless of the level of their
retirement income. Rather, it is emphasized that the exemption applies only to a few top-level employees who exercise
substantial executive authority over a significant number of
employees and a large volume of business.1 20
The EEOC further states that to qualify for this exemption the employee must be entitled to receive an annual retirement benefit of at least $27,000 per year within at least
sixty days prior to the effective date of his retirement.1 21 Payments for each year of the employee's retirement must total at
least $27,000. The regulations forbid setting off yearly payments which are calculated to fall below $27,000 against those
years in which payments exceed $27,000, except in the instance of a lump sum payment discussed below. 122
Further, the annual retirement benefit must be nonforfeitable. Accordingly, the EEOC states that the exemption may
not be applied to employees subject to a retirement plan
which provides that benefits will cease or be reduced upon the
occurrence of a stated contingency, such as, for example, an
employee litigating against his former employer or obtaining
employment with a competitor. 23 Retirement benefits are not,
however, deemed forfeitable if they are discontinued or suspended for reasons permitted under section 411(a)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.1 24 Nor will an annual retirement benefit be deemed forfeitable merely because the minimum statutory benefit level is not guaranteed against the possibility of

118. Id. § 1625.12(b).

119. Id. § 1625.12(d)(1), (2).
120. Id. § 1625.12(d)(2).

121. Id. § 1625.12(i).
122. Id. § 1625.12(j).
123. Id. § 1625.12(k)(1).

124. This provision was added for clarification to the amendments as originally
proposed by the DOL, which appeared at 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148 (1978).
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plan bankruptcy. However, in order for the exemption to be
applicable, there must be at least a reasonable expectation as
of the effective date of retirement that the plan will meet its
obligations.12"
An interesting aspect of the EEOC's interpretive bulletin
is its provision allowing an employer, after involuntarily retiring a bona fide executive or high policymaker, to offer that
employee a position other than an executive or policymaking
position with the company. However, if the employee accepts
such a position, the company may not thereafter discriminate
against him because of his age.12 Thus, it would appear that
an employee who is offered and accepts such a position could
not then be involuntarily retired until age seventy. This interpretation may act as a disincentive to providing alternate employment to former high-level executives who are involuntarily retired at age sixty-five.
The EEOC has also issued regulations on the subject of
calculating the amount of the retirement benefit available to
the bona fide executive or high policymaker. 27 They indicate
that an employee must be entitled either to the equivalent of
a $27,000 straight life annuity for each year of his lifetime after retirement or to a lump sum payment upon retirement
with which it is possible to purchase a straight life annuity
yielding at least $27,000 per year.
These regulations also state, as indicated in the statute,
that Social Security, employee contributions, rollover contributions and contributions of other employers may not be included in calculating the $27,000-a-year benefit.1 28 Moreover,
the value of benefits from any other plans such as health or
life insurance is excluded from the calculation.1 29 The only retirement benefits which may be summed for purposes of determining section 12(a)(1) retirement benefits are those from

125. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(k)(2) (1980). The proposed amendments had required
that the plan be "sufficiently funded." This requirement was deleted in the final

amendments in order to bring unfunded deferred compensation plans within the exemption. Such plans are a common form of compensation for executives and tend to

be unfunded to assure that the employee will not be deemed to have constructively
received any funds prior to retirement.
126. Id. § 1625.12(c).
127. Id. § 1627.17.
128. Id. § 1627.17(c).
129. Id. § 1627.17(d).
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pension, profit sharing, savings or deferred compensation
plans.
The method of calculating the amount of the employee's
contributions to his retirement plan depends on whether the
retirement plan is a defined contribution or defined benefit
plan. In either event, the EEOC attempts to ensure that the
employer's contribution equals at least $27,000 for each year
of retirement. 13 0
2.

The Tenured Employee Exemption

Section 12(d), which was added by the 1978 amendments,
provides:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65
years of age but not 70 years of age, and who is serving
under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) at an institution of
higher education (as defined by section 1141(a) of title 20)
[section 1202(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965].131
This exemption took effect on January 1, 1979, and is to be
repealed on July 1, 1982.
The Conference Committee Report provides little guidance
as to the application of this exemption. However, the DOL
proposed an amendment, which the EEOC subsequently
adopted and issued, to its interpretive bulletin on the ADEA
to deal with this exemption. 13 2 The bulletin's definition of "institution of higher education" encompasses virtually all public
and private universities and two- and four-year colleges. The
definition also includes any one-year technical school which
grants tenure.1 33
The EEOC also states that this exemption is not necessarily limited to teachers. Other persons who receive tenure, for
example, academic deans, scientific researchers, librarians and
counseling staff members, are also covered by the exemption. 3 Not surprisingly, however, the regulations indicate
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. § 1627.17(e)(2)-(4).
29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (Supp. 1I 1979).
29 C.F.R. § 1627.11 (1980).
Id. § 1625.11(c).
Id. § 1625.11(d)(1).
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that this exemption will be narrowly construed.13 5
The phrase "unlimited tenure" is likewise undefined in the
1978 amendments. The EEOC states in its interpretive bulletin that the generally recognized definition of tenure applies
to this exemption. Tenure is defined as an arrangement under
which a faculty appointment is continued until retirement for
age or physical disability, subject to termination for cause or
termination because of financial exigency or change of academic program. A tenure contract which is defined for a term
of years does not qualify for this exemption.1 3 6 The EEOC
adopted the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure developed jointly by the Association of
American Colleges and the American Association of University Professors as its position on the minimum standards nec1 37
essary to constitute the tenure relationship.
In a position similar to its interpretation of the bona fide
executive/high policymaker exemption, the EEOC permits an
educational institution to retain a tenured employee in a nontenured post after his involuntary retirement. However, if the
employee accepts such a post he may not thereafter be treated
any less favorably than younger employees because of his age.
Thus, it appears that educational institutions which retain
tenured employees in nontenured posts after involuntary retirement will not be able to compel the retirement of these
individuals from their new posts until age seventy.1 38
To date, this exemption has been the subject of just one
reported case. In Karlen v. New York University,3 9 a tenured
professor who had been retired involuntarily sought a declaratory judgment that the exemption was unconstitutional. The
court avoided the issue by finding a lack of a justiciable controversy. The court reasoned that a breach of contract claim
had not yet been resolved and that the plaintiff was not seeking reinstatement to the faculty.
B. Mandatory Retirement
The second major substantive provision of the 1978
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. § 1625.11(b).
Id. § 1625.11(e)(1).
Id. § 1625.11(e)(2).
Id. § 1625.11(g).
464 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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amendments is the amendment to section 4(f)(2),14 ° which
makes clear the congressional intention to prohibit the involuntary retirement of employees before age seventy. Prior to
the 1978 amendments the Act permitted an employer to:
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension,
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purpose of this chapter, except that no such employee bene41
fit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.2
In United Airlines v. McMann, 42 the United States Supreme

Court construed this provision to permit an employer, acting
pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan adopted prior
to the enactment of the ADEA, to involuntarily retire an employee before he reached age sixty-five.
Congress amended section 4(f)(2) to provide that it is not
unlawful for an employer to:
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension,
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and
no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section
12(a) of this title because of the age
48
of such individual.

This provision was subject to an important exception. The
amendments provided that employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements in effect on September 1, 1977, were
not to be protected by amended section 4(f)(2) until the termination date of the collective bargaining agreement or January 1, 1980, whichever occurred first."
The Conference Committee stated that the purpose of the
amendment to section 4(f)(2) was to change the McMann result, since one of the original purposes of the Act was to pro140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
95-256,

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. m 1979).
Id. § 623(f)(2) (1976) (amended 1978).
434 U.S. 192 (1977).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1979) (emphasis added).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
§ 2(b), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
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hibit the involuntary retirement of an employee within the
protected age group because of his age. 14 5 The Conference
Committee also stated that employee benefit plans in effect
prior to the date of the enactment of the amendments are not
exempt from the provisions of amended section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate either the Act or the 1978
amendments. Although this clearly suggests that no further
involuntary retirements before age seventy may now be made,
even if required by a benefit plan adopted before the 1978
amendments, a serious question has arisen as to whether the
amendment should be retroactively applied. Retroactive application of this section would have the effect of making unlawful involuntary retirements made prior to the 1978
amendments.
The DOL drafted amendments to its interpretive bulletin
regarding the section 4(f)(2) amendment, but these were not
published and explained until the publication of the EEOC's
proposed interpretations on November 30, 1979.148 The proposed interpretations state that the amendment applies to all
new and existing seniority systems and employee benefit
plans.1 4 7 Thus, the EEOC's position is that any provision requiring or permitting involuntary retirement is unlawful regardless of whether the provision antedates the 1967 Act or
the 1978 amendments: The EEOC bases its view on "unequivocal legislative history" and on Bradley v. Richmond School
Board,1 48 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a court is to
apply the statutory law in effect at the time of its decision
unless manifest injustice would result or unless there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.
The courts have divided on the issue of retroactivity. For
example, in Sikora v. American Can Co.,1 49 the Third Circuit
held that the 1978 amendments prohibiting involuntary retirement before age seventy do not apply retroactively. Support for this conclusion was found in the "equivocal" language

145. CoNF. COMM. REP., supra note 10, at 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 529.

146. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,862 (1979) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9).
147.
148.
sion for
149.

Id. (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b)(1)).
416 U.S. 696 (1974). In that case, the Court decided that a new federal proviattorneys' fees in civil rights cases could be applied retroactively.
622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980).
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of the amendment - the amendment "shall take effect on the
date of enactment" - and in the amendment's brief legislative history. Furthermore, the manifest injustice exception to
the Bradley v. Richmond School Board presumption of retroactivity was found to apply. In this regard, the court noted
that where retroactive application of statutes in other circumstances has threatened the solvency of pension plans, the issue has been treated specially by the Supreme Court, 150 and
that the ADEA provisions affecting pension funds likewise
should not be applied retroactively, absent a clear legislative
command.' 5 '
In contrast to the Sikora conclusion is the analysis of the
district court in Davis v. Boy Scouts of America. 52 There, the

court reasoned that the application of the 1978 amendment to
an involuntary retirement completed prior to the enactment
of the amendments would not be a retroactive application of
it, but rather an application of the law currently in effect. 5 "
The court therefore denied the employer's motion to dismiss,
which was premised on the fact that the retirement had conformed with the law in effect at that time.'"
The issue of retroactivity no doubt will continue to confront the courts. The conflicting interpretations of the amendments announced by the EEOC and by the majority of the
courts which have considered the issue, in addition to the dif150. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), in
which the Court concluded that it was inappropriate to award retroactive relief in a
Title VII action where sex-differentiated employee contributions to a pension fund
were found unlawful.
151. The Fifth Circuit in Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. Co., 623 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980),
the Seventh Circuit in Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1980) and
several district decisions have reached the same conclusion as the Third Circuit on
similar bases. See, e.g., Marshall v. Delaware River and Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886
(D. Del. 1979); Aldendifer v. Continental Airlines, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090
(C.D. Cal. 1978); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978),
modified sub. nom. EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 632 F.2d 1107 (1980); Marshall v.
Atlantic Container Line, 470 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In a related context, the
court in Issarescu v. Cleland, 465 F. Supp. 657 (D.R.I. 1979) refused to retroactively
apply the amendment abolishing the upper age limit in federal employment.
152. 457 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1978).
153. Id. at 673.
154. The rationale of Davis was cited with approval in Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich. 1979), where the court ruled that involuntary retirement under a pension plan which provided for the exercise of discretion by
the employer violated the ADEA if age was a factor in the decision.
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fering analytical frameworks which courts have utilized when
considering this issue, will be a source of pressure to continue
litigating the question.
As noted above, the 1978 amendments provided for a delay
in extending the Act's proscription to employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements. The EEOC has taken a narrow view of this exemption. The EEOC's proposed interpretations provide that the delay affects only those employees who
are sixty-five years old but not seventy on or after January 1,
1979. These proposed regulations also provide that these employees cannot be retired involuntarily unless (1) the retirement age specified in the plan is sixty-five or over; (2) the retirement is authorized by the express terms of a bona fide
seniority system or a bona fide employee benefit plan which is
not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act; and (3) the
terms of the plan were adopted no later than September 1,
1977, and were pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
in effect on September 1, 1977.155

With respect to employees affected by the delay, the
EEOC proposed 5 e to incorporate into its regulatory scheme
the original DOL interpretation'" on this subject, which
stated that involuntary retirement, irrespective of age, is authorized only if it is pursuant to the terms of a retirement or
pension plan meeting the requirements of section 4(f)(2). The
DOL regulations provide that in order to meet the requirements of section 4(f)(2), the involuntary retirement provision
must be (1) contained in a bona fide pension or retirement
plan, (2) required by the terms of the plan, and (3) essential
to the plan's economic survival or to some other legitimate
business purpose. 5
C. Pension and Benefit Levels
Prior to the 1978 amendments most employee pension and
benefit plans were geared to a retirement age of sixty-five.
Employers were concerned that raising the protected age limit
to seventy and forbidding involuntary retirements before that
155.
156.
157.
158.

44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,862 (1979) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(d)(2)).
Id. (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(a)(1)).
29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1980).
Id. § 860.120(a)-(d).
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age would result in increased costs associated with the maintenance of the pension plans. The problems these amendments pose to pension and to other benefit plans are considered separately.
1. Pension Plans
Most pension plans provide for retirement and the commencement of pension benefits at age sixty-five. Thus, many
employers expressed concern that increasing the retirement
age to seventy would require them to provide additional pension benefits to the employee working beyond age sixty-five,
obviously at substantially increased cost. Employer concern
focused primarily on the effect which increasing the
mandatory retirement age limit to seventy would have on defined benefit plans. 159 The cost problem arises because the
funding of a defined benefit plan is calculated on the basis of
ERISA's "normal retirement age," which, generally, is age
160
sixty-five.
Thus, if raising the protected age limit under the ADEA
also changes ERISA's normal retirement age, the funding
formula of many plans would be jeopardized. Moreover, under
those plans which provide benefits through a formula based
on years of service, increased contributions for years of service
after age sixty-five might also be required because of the
ADEA amendments. There was also concern that employers
would incur additional costs if they were required to pay the
159. Pension plans are generally of two types - defined contribution and defined
benefit plans. A defined contribution plan is typically one in which an employer contributes annually to a plan. A separate account is established for each employee, and
the employer's annual contribution is allocated among these accounts. No set benefit
is promised to the employee upon retirement. Rather, the final amount depends on
the success of the investment program undertaken by the plan's trustees. A defined
benefit plan, on the other hand, is one in which a definitely determinable benefit is
provided to the employee upon retirement. This is done by fixing a flat monthly payment due to the retiree, or by establishing a schedule of payments determined by a
formula which is usually based on the employee's salary and length of service. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
160. Without attempting to discuss all of the nuances of ERISA, which are beyond the scope of this paper, "normal retirement age" is age sixty-five or the later of
age sixty-five or ten years from the date on which an employee is enrolled in the plan.
Based on the normal retirement age, an actuary will determine the amount an employer must contribute each year in order to fund the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24)
(1976).
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actuarial equivalent of an employee's normal retirement benefit to those employees who work beyond the normal retirement age. 161
The House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1978
amendments state that the amendments do not affect an employer's pension obligations. Rather, an employee's retirement
benefit is ascertained when he reaches the normal retirement
age. Additional service beyond the normal retirement age has
no effect on the employee's pension benefits. Thus, under this
view an employer would not be required to credit service beyond the normal retirement age for purposes of benefit accrual. Nor would an employer be required to pay the actuarial
equivalent of the normal pension benefit to employees who
1 62
work beyond the normal retirement age.
During the colloquy preceding final passage of the amendments, floor leaders in the House of Representatives and the
Senate encouraged the DOL to issue guidelines regarding the
effect of section 4(f)(2) on an employer's obligation with respect to benefits for older employees. The floor leaders also
stated explicitly that, in conformity with the DOL view expressed to Congress, 6 3 section 4(f)(2) would permit an employer to cease contributions to a defined contribution plan
16
after an employee had reached normal retirement age. '

161. The concern about actuarial equivalency arises with respect to defined benefit plans. Under such plans, the employee's benefit is determined under the plan's
formula. If, for example, an employee works beyond the normal retirement age or the
payment of pension benefits does not commence until after the normal retirement age
and the plan provided that the employee is entitled to the actuarial equivalent of his
normal retirement benefit, an actuary would have to recompute the benefits. This
recomputation would have to reflect the employee's additional length of service, the
additional length of time during which the plan has had use of the funds contributed
on the employee's account, and the fact that the employee's projected life expectancy
is now shorter. In effect, these payments of such actuarial equivalents would be larger
than the payments that would have been made had the employee retired at the normal retirement age.
162. See H.R. REP. No. 95-527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977); S. REP., supra note
15, at 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws at 504.
163. This reference was to the view stated in a letter from Assistant Secretary of
Labor Donald Elisburg at the request of Augustus Hawkins, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities. The letter was published at 123 CONG.
REc. 30564 (1977).
164. See 124 CONG. REc. H2270-71 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Hawkins); 124 CONG. REc. S4450-52 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sens. Williams and Javits).
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The DOL amended its interpretive bulletin to address this
complex area in accordance with the legislature's intentions.165
In essence, the DOL's interpretations turn on whether a plan
is a defined contribution or defined benefit plan, and if a defined benefit plan, whether it is one covered by ERISA. The
EEOC drafted changes to these interpretations.""6 After receiving strong objections from the DOL,1 67 the EEOC delayed

final publication of its draft interpretations and may reconsider them when it has attained its full personnel complement
under the new administration.
Under the DOL interpretations currently in effect, employees hired before the normal retirement age may not be
excluded from defined contribution plans which are not
,,supplemental." 168
With respect to defined benefit plans covered by ERISA,
no exclusion is allowed for employees hired more than five
years before normal retirement age. Employees hired more
than five years prior to normal retirement age may be excluded from a defined benefit plan not covered by ERISA
only if the exclusion is justified on the basis of cost considerations. Employees hired less than five years prior to the normal
retirement age or after the normal retirement age may be excluded from a defined benefit plan regardless of whether that
plan is covered by ERISA. 69 The EEOC has proposed to replace these interpretations with broad rules prohibiting denial
of pension benefits on account of age.
As noted above, the DOL interpretations provide that
under a nonsupplemental1 7 0 defined contribution plan, an em165. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1980). The EEOC proposed to renumber the DOL's
rules on this subject as 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,857, 68,862 (1972). The
DOL's interpretations will remain in effect unless and until modified by the EEOC.
166. The EEOC's proposals were published in 108 DAmy LAB. REP. (BNA) X-1
(June 3, 1980).
167. The DOL's objections were expressed in a letter dated October 16, 1980,
from Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall to EEOC Chairperson Eleanor Holmes Norton. 213 DAmY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Oct. 31, 1980).

168. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(A) and (B)(1) (1980). The DOL defines as
"supplemental" a defined contribution plan which is provided in addition to a defined benefit plan or another defined contribution plan. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1).
169. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(A).
170. The EEOC also proposes to redefine "supplemental" as "defined contribution plans which do not set contribution levels in accordance with a specific and reasonable benefit goal." 108 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-4. The Secretary of
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ployer may cease making contributions for any participant
who works after the normal retirement age. The EEOC proposed to permit a cessation of contributions only with respect
to employees who have accumulated enough funds in their individual accounts to provide for "a reasonable level of benefits
17
' 1
in accordance with the benefit goal set by the plan.
Understandably, the Secretary objected to this proposal,
noting that the proposed revision is neither grounded in the
legislative history of the amendments1 7 2 nor, perhaps more
importantly, ascertainable to employers. Specifically, the Secretary questioned how, by whom and when 173 the judgment is
to be made whether, in each case, "a reasonable level" of benefits had accrued to an employee. For example, assigning the
responsibility for making this determination to the courts or
to the EEOC would seem to require a substantial expansion of
their present function of deciding whether or not a particular
benefit, whatever its level,1 74 is provided on a basis not pro-

hibited by law.
The EEOC has also proposed to change the current DOL
interpretation permitting employers to exclude from defined
benefit plans employees hired less than five years prior to nor-

Labor objected to this change, noting that the EEOC's proposal provides less protection to older workers and less delineation to employers than the DOL's definition. 213
DAiLY LAB. REP., supra note 167, at E-3.
171. 108 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-4.
172. The Secretary pointed out that there was no indication in the legislative history that the term "supplemental" was intended to have anything but its normal
meaning of "additional." 213 DAiLY LAB. REP., supra note 167, at E-3.
173. For example, the Secretary queried whether an employer who, because of
investment losses, could not provide the intended level of benefits at normal retirement age, would have to make contributions throughout the remaining years of an
individual's employment or only until the account level reached a certain amount. Id.
at E-3 to E-4.
174. Title VII generally has been understood to require only that benefits which
an employer has chosen to provide be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. This
normally requires a comparison of one group with another. Recently, the EEOC and
various plaintiffs have asserted that in certain circumstances, a determination must
be made that certain groups are not getting "enough" even though there is no one
else with whom they can be compared directly. This theory, most often directed to
complaints of underpayment of women performing "women's jobs," has met with
mixed reception in the courts. See IUE v. Westinghouse Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.
1980); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979),
rehearingdenied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
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mal retirement age or after normal retirement age (retirement-age hires). The EEOC would find a retirement provision
permitting an employer to expend nothing for pension benefits for these employees to be discriminatory because of age. 17 5
To implement its position, the EEOC has proposed two alternatives. Under the first, employers would be required to
provide pension benefits for retirement-age hires through a
plan or agreement separate from that covering employees
hired at least five years prior to normal retirement age. Presumably, the EEOC would require the employer to spend the
same amount for pension benefits for newly hired retirementage employees as it spends for employees covered by the general plan. 17 6 Under the second alternative, retirement-age
hires would have to be included in the defined benefit plan

covering the other employees, but the annual benefit accrual
for retirement-age hires could be reduced in accordance with
the premium cost for such employees as compared to the cost
for employees hired five years before normal retirement age.177

This proposal seems inconsistent with ERISA, which permits a defined benefit plan to exclude individuals hired less
than five years prior to normal retirement age. In considering
the 1978 amendments, Congress was quite concerned about

possible conflicts with ERISA.

"s

In its interpretations, the

DOL essentially deferred to this concern by taking the posi-

tion that Congress intended the ADEA and ERISA to be con175. 108 DAmLY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-4.
176. In an introductory explanation of its proposed interpretations, the EEOC
states that the rules are specifically intended to require, inter alia, that equal contributions be expended for pension benefits for older workers. Id. at X-3.
177. Id. at X-4.
178. The request by several congressmen that the DOL analyze certain specific
questions regarding the applicability of section 4(f)(2) was described by Assistant
Secretary Donald Elisburg as a request for an analysis of potential conflicts between
ERISA and the proposed amendments. The letter of Assistant Secretary Elisburg responding to that request (the Elisburg letter) was incorporated into the text of the
Senate Committee Report. See S. REP., supra note 15, at 13-16, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 517-19.
The House Report, which preceded the Elisburg letter, also addressed itself to
possible conflicts between the amendments and ERISA and stated flatly "Nothing in
these amendments would change the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, and no additional requirements would be made of pension plan
programs under these amendments.... These amendments do not require that any
additional benefits, benefit accruals or actuarial adjustments be provided other than
those required under ERISA." H.R. REP., supra note 162, at 9.
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strued in a parallel manner." 9
Secretary Marshall described the DOL's position as consistent with the legislative history of ERISA, which, in his view,
indicated that the exclusion of retirement-age individuals
from that Act rested on cost considerations. In contrast, the
Secretary objected to the EEOC's proposal as inconsistent
with the legislative histories of ERISA and the amendments
to the ADEA. 180
To the degree that Congress did not intend the 1978
amendments to impose upon employers requirements greater
than those imposed by ERISA, the Secretary's objection is
well taken. Furthermore, Congress apparently did not want
the amendments to impose added financial burdens on
employers.1 8 1
Nevertheless, it is not certain that the Secretary's view will
ultimately prevail either with the EEOC or with the courts.
The EEOC acknowledged the legislative concern regarding
possible conflict between ERISA and the amendments. 82
However, rather than construing this concern as a mandate
for parallel construction, the EEOC views this legislative history as indicative of congressional intent that the ADEA
should not prohibit any benefit practice which is necessary to
comply with ERISA.
While this interpretation certainly contravenes some legislative statements,1 8 3 it is consistent with the general notions of
179. 213 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 167, at E-2.

180. Id. at E-3 to E-4.
181. See, 'e.g., notes 162-64 & 178, supra. As Secretary Marshall points out, it
often is difficult to isolate and identify the extra cost incurred by hiring an employee
five years prior to normal retirement age, particularly if the annual cost to the employer fluctuates according to projected investment returns, actuarial assumptions or
other factors. 213 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 167, at E-3. An employer presumably
would have to attempt to identify these extra costs each year in order to determine
the amount of its obligation to retirement-age employees for that year.
182. In its introduction to its proposed interpretations, 108 DAILY LAB. REP.,
supra note 166, X-1 to X-2, the EEOC alluded only to the Elisburg letter and not to
other statements of legislative concern such as that contained in the House Report,
supra note 162.
183. For example, this interpretation seems contrary to the statement contained
in the House Report, supra note 176. The EEOC did not mention this statement;
instead, it addressed only the Elisburg letter, which it interpreted as merely an opinion that plans that were in compliance with ERISA probably would not be greatly
affected by the amendments. 108 DAmiY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at E-3. This interpretation conveniently ignored the fact that Elisburg set forth the DOL's position
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the scope of an act designed to eliminate discrimination by a
broad prohibition.'" More specifically, to permit employers to
avoid any expenditures for retirement benefits for employees
beyond a certain age seems inconsistent with the ADEA's
broad proscription. Of course, Congress may have intended to
provide employers an incentive to hire and retain older workers. Not surprisingly, the EEOC was able to find some isolated
and general statements in the amendments' legislative history
indicating this was not the congressional intent.185
The EEOC also proposed1 86 changes to the DOL rule that
an employer may fail to credit the years of employment after
normal retirement age to the formula for determining benefit
accruals under a defined benefit plan.1 87 The DOL does not

require that a deferred benefit plan provide for accrual of
benefits for employees working past normal retirement age.188
This, too, would be changed under the EEOC's proposed revisions. Under the EEOC's proposal, an employer could cease to
credit years of service or to accrue benefits after normal retirement age only in the case of individuals entitled to full,
actuarially unreduced benefits. In other words, the EEOC
with respect to whether the ADEA as amended would require employers to make
certain changes not required by the ERISA, and in most instances, opined that it
would not. The Assistant Secretary's opinion on the effect of the ADEA was as much
a part of the legislative record as was his opinion that the amendments would not
conflict with ERISA.
184. See, e.g., Los Angeles Water Dep't v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), wherein
the employer was found to have violated Title VII by requiring its female employees
to pay more than male employees for pension benefits, even though the higher charge
was the result of higher costs, on an actuarial basis, of providing women with the
projected benefit.
185. The EEOC cited legislative comments to the effect that the ADEA should
not be interpreted as a license to cease to provide reasonable benefits to older employees, 124 CONG. REC. H2270-71 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978) (remarks of Congressman
Hawkins) and that welfare, including pension plans, will be deemed in compliance
with Act where the actual amount of cost incurred on behalf of the older worker is
equal to that incurred on behalf of the younger worker. 124 CONG. Rxc. S4450-52
(daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Senator Javits).
It is questionable whether such isolated and general comments are sufficient to
overcome the explicit statements contained in the House Report, supra note 162, or
the thrust and statements contained in the crucial Elisburg letter, supra note 163.
186. 108 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-4.
187. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(5) (1980).
188. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(5) and (7). The DOL would not require a defined
benefit plan to take into account salary increases and benefit improvements under
the plan which occur after an employee's normal retirement age. Id. at subs. (7).
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would require an employer to continue crediting years of service beyond age sixty-five until the employee becomes entitled
to the maximum benefits under the plan. In its preamble, the
EEOC stated that where a defined benefit plan uses years of
service in the benefit formula, the crediting of years of service
after normal retirement age for an employee could be discounted only where the plan specifies a maximum number of
years to be credited and where the employee has attained that
189
maximum.

The EEOC grounds its proposals on its interpretation of a
statement made by Congressman Weiss, who said that the
amendments to the ADEA should not be interpreted as "a icense to cease to provide reasonable benefits to their older
employees." 19 0 However, the EEOC's interpretation of this
general and somewhat vague statement by one, albeit important, congressman seems incorrect in light of the explicit
statements to the contrary contained in both House1 91 and
Senate 192 Committee Reports and in the very important Elisburg letter. 19 3 Furthermore, the EEOC's proposal with respect
189. 108 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-4.
190. 124 CONG. REc. H2276 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978), cited in 108 DAMY LAB. REP.,

supra note 166, at X-3 (emphasis added).
191. H.R. REP., supra note 162, at 9 ("These amendments do not require that any
additional benefits, benefit accruals or actuarial adjustments be provided other than
those required under ERISA.").
As Assistant Secretary Elisburg points out in his letter, 123 CONG. REC. 30564
(1977), ERISA does not require accrual of benefits past normal retirement age.
192. S. REP., supra note 15, at 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 508 (legislation under consideration "does not require the accrual of additional benefits ... to employees who work beyond the plan's normal retirement
date.").
In addition, the Senate Report incorporated the full text of the Elisburg letter and
stated expressly that the letter in its detailed remarks about pensions and retirements, "reaffirms the committee's intent in this regard." Id.
193. See note 163 supra. With respect to the crediting of service years and accrual
of benefits past normal retirement age, the Assistant Secretary opined:
1. Would an employer be required to credit years of service for purposes
of benefit accrual after normal retirement age?
It is our view that nothing in the ADEA or in the proposed amendments
would require an employer to credit, for purposes of benefit accrual, those
years of service which occur after an employee's normal retirement date.
ERISA likewise does not require such accrual.
5. Assuming that under ERISA a plan need not provide for benefit accruals for an employee who continues to work after the normal retirement age,
would an employer's failure to provide for the accrual of benefits for such an
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to crediting years of service beyond normal retirement age
would limit employers to one out of three options provided
under ERISA for demonstrating that benefits are being properly accrued. 9 4 This would seem to be the kind of conflict
that Congress clearly intended to avoid.

Finally, as Secretary Marshall observed,29 5 the EEOC's
proposal seems ambiguous as well as overreaching. It would
seem that the term "fully accrued unreduced benefit" should
be defined according to the terms of the plan. If a plan pro-

vides, on a bona fide basis, that benefits cease to accrue when
a participant reaches normal retirement age, this would ap-

pear to be the point at which the participant's fully accrued,
unreduced benefit should be ascertained. However, the
EEOC's proposal appears to require an employer with such a
plan to continue accruing benefits for employees who, despite
having attained normal retirement age and full accrual of unreduced benefits, have not yet attained the maximum number

of years allowable under the plan. If this is the EEOC's meaning, its proposal seems to clearly overreach the EEOC's authority for it, in effect, sets minimum levels of retirement

benefits.
With respect to the DOL's interpretation that a defined
benefit plan need not actuarially adjust benefits, or otherwise

take account of salary increases or benefit improvements,
under an employee pension plan which continues past an employee's normal retirement age, the EEOC proposed two alter-

employee constitute age discrimination under the ADEA?
In our opinion, a bona fide pension plan that provides that no benefits accrue to a participant who continues service with the employer after attainment
of normal retirement age would not violate the ADEA .... [T]he legislative
history of the ADEA indicates that Section 4(f)(2) was intended to allow age to
be considered in funding a plan and in determining the level of benefits to be
paid. We believe that it will run counter to intent of the Act to require a plan
to provide for benefit accrual after the plan's normal retirement age."
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(b)-i (1980). See also the Assistant Secretary's comments on these provisions, in the Elisburg letter, supra note 163:
Two of these tests... explicitly permit a plan to provide that no benefits will
accrue after normal retirement age (26 C.F.R. § 1.411(b)-1). The third test requires the accrual of benefits after normal retirement age. It should be noted,
however, that no employer is required to select the third test, provided that he
satisfies one of the two other tests.
195. 213 DAIy LAB. REP., supra note 167, at E-4.
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native revisions. 196 The first would have required the benefits
available at normal retirement age to be actuarially adjusted
at the time of actual retirement. In addition, the interest accumulated on the benefits from normal retirement age to the
date of actual retirement would have to be added to the
amount of the benefits as actuarially adjusted. The second alternative would have required a recalculation of the normal
retirement benefits to include salary increases and benefit improvements postdating the normal retirement date of an employee who continues to work. These proposals, again, seem
obviously inconsistent with clear legislative history indicating
that accrual and actuarial adjustment of benefits should not
197
be required past normal retirement age.
The EEOC also proposed a major change in the DOL's
"benefit package" 19 rule. Under the DOL's rule, employers
may use a "package" approach to evaluate the level of benefits employees receive rather than a benefit-by-benefit approach, except that retirement or pension plans are not permitted to be included within the package.19 9 The DOL
adopted this approach because it viewed the legislative history
of the 1978 amendments as creating special rules for retire20 0
ment or pension plans.
The EEOC proposed to allow the inclusion of pension and
retirement benefits in a "benefit package." However, it would
closely scrutinize packages which offset an increase in a
nonpension benefit with a reduction in a pension or retirement benefit when the offset is greater than that allowed
under its other rules. The EEOC would not allow the inclusion of pension and retirement costs in a package where the
result was to the detriment of older workers. In no case would
it have permitted an employer to avoid making any expendi-

196. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(i)(iv)(B)(4) and (7) (1980).
197. See note 178 supra.With respect to the EEOC's proposal regarding the addition of interest under the first alternative, it is interesting to note that in response to
a question whether the proposed increase in the upper age limit would increase funding costs of pension plans, the Assistant Secretary opines that "[s]avings would of
course come from the added years of accumulated interest on the fund." Elisburg
letter, supra note 163.
198. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2) (1980).
199. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii).
200. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979). This explanation was cited by Secretary Marshall
in his letter to Chairperson Norton, 213 DAiLY LAB. RuP., supra note 167, at E-5.
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tures for pension benefits on behalf of employees protected by
20 1
the Act.
The DOL objected to this proposal, contending that it was
inconsistent with the congressional intent that special funding
arrangements other than a straight cost approach apply to
pension and retirement plans.20 2 The DOL also objected to
this EEOC rule because it was vague; it did not indicate what
circumstances would justify reductions in pension and retirement benefits.20 3 Moreover, in certain circumstances, the rule
may have conflicted with ERISA. These objections were legitimate; yet since cost was a congressional concern, it would appear that employers should be able to offset the added costs
resulting from compliance with the EEOC's rules regarding
pension benefits, with reductions in other fringe benefits.
It should be noted that neither the DOL's "exemptions"
for contributions and benefits nor the EEOC's proposed modifications are set out in the Act or its amendments. Thus, they
are justified only if authorized by the Act's legislative history.
However, the legislative history on this subject is confusing. If
the legislative history is interpreted literally, it signals an interpretation of the Act, in the area of pension benefits, at
odds with principles normally applicable in the employment
dicrimination setting. This conflict will have to be resolved by
the courts or by clarifying legislation.
2.

Benefits Plans

A second question raised as a result of increasing the age
limit to seventy is whether employers are required, under section 4(f)(2) of the Act, to provide the same level of nonretirement benefits for employees over age sixty-five as are provided for employees under age sixty-five. Prior to the 1978
201. 108 DAILY LAB. REP., supra note 166, at X-5. See also note 170 supra.
202. 213 DAIIy LAB. RFP., supra note 167, at E-5. The Secretary is particularly
concerned that the EEOC's approach subjects pension and retirement plans to the
straight cost approach that prevails under section 4(f)(2), in derogation of the
noncost considerations applicable to pension and retirement plans.
203. For example, it is foreseeable that some employees may be more concerned
with health insurance benefits than with pension benefits. It is unclear whether the
EEOC would permit individual benefit packages to be justified on this basis, or
whether the package generally applicable to employees must be evaluated as a whole
and, if the latter, whether some sort of employee vote must be taken to justify increasing some other benefit at the expense of pension benefits.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:607

amendments most benefits plans, such as health, life and disability plans, terminated benefits at age sixty-five. Thus, employers would have to purchase supplemental plans to cover
employees over age sixty-five if, by virtue of the higher age
limit, they were required to continue benefits at the same
level for employees over sixty-five.
To address this problem congressional reports accompanying the 1978 amendments indicate that under section 4(f)(2)
an employer may reduce nonretirement benefits for older employees when acting pursuant to bona fide employee benefit
plans. This legislative history reflects the congressional concern that raising the protectable age limit would result in potentially increased cost for employee welfare benefit plans,
such as disability, health, life and other forms of insurance.
Thus, the 1978 amendments would not alter the practice common among some employers of stablizing the costs of non-retirement benefit plans by either reducing plan coverage for
older workers or increasing the amount of the required employee contribution to the plan as the worker gets older. 2 "
The DOL addressed this issue in amendments to its interpretive bulletin. 2 5 These interpretations state that the legislative history of section 4(f)(2) reveals that age-based reductions in nonretirement employee benefits are permitted where
such reductions are justified by significant cost considerations.
Thus, such items as paid vacations cannot be reduced, since
the vacations of employees over age sixty-five do not cost an
employer any more than the vacations of younger employees.
However, benefits available to older workers under bona fide
insurance plans (within the meaning of section 4(f)(2)) may be
reduced to the extent necessary to achieve approximately
equal cost for older and younger employees. Accordingly, a
benefit plan will be deemed in compliance with the Act if the
actual amount of contributions made on behalf of the older
employees equals contributions on behalf of younger employ204. S. REP., supra note 15, at 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

Naws at 508. See also H.R. REP., supra note 162, at 8.
205. The final DOL interpretations are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1980).
The EEOC proposed interpretations, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979), renumbered the

DOL rules as 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10, but otherwise adopted them without change. Citations herein are to the DOL's numbers.
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ees, even if the older employees thereby receive less cov20 6
erage.
The DOL and the EEOC take the position that the exemption must be narrowly construed and so places upon the employer the burden of showing that each of the three key elements of section 4(f)(2) has been met.207 The employer must
first show that the plan is "bona fide" within the meaning of
section 4(f)(2). The interpretations state that a plan meets
this requirement only if the plan's terms have been accurately
described in writing to the employees and only if the employer actually provides benefits in accordance with those
terms. Compliance with ERISA disclosure regulations will satisfy this requirement.20 8
This requirement has not been widely litigated. Prior to
the interpretations, several courts rejected a disclosure requirement and held, instead, that a plan is "bona fide" if it
exists and if it pays substantial benefits. 20 9 A more important
question than disclosure, since the interpretations, has been
whether a plan in fact exists.
The second element of a section 4(f)(2) exemption requires
an employer to observe the terms of a plan.2 10 The interpretations state that this requirement is. met only when an employer acts pursuant to the specific terms of a plan. The requirement is not met if the plan does not by its terms require
an employer to reduce benefits for older employees.2 1 '
There have been few, if any, decisions'dicussing this requirement. However, some guidance.as to the validity of these
interpretations may be gleaned, from decisions involving the
involuntary retirement of employees prior to the 1978 amendments. 12 The Circuit Courts of Appeals for both the

206. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1980).
207. The relevant provisions of § 4(f)(2) are set out at text accompanying note 141
supra.

208. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1980).
209. See, e.g., Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974);
Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 470 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
210. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
211. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1980). An "employee benefit plan" within the meaning of section 4(f)(2) is defined by the interpretations as one which provides employees with traditional fringe benefits. Thus, wages and salary will never fall within the
section 4(0(2) exemption. Id. § 860.120(b).
212. As noted above, the 1978 amendments added a provision to section 4(f)(2) to
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Fourth 213 and Seventh 214 Circuits have held that, in the context of pre-amendment compulsory retirement, 15 an employer
has observed the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan
only when the plan expressly authorizes the forced termination. 216 The Seventh Circuit found this result required, in
part, by the importance of giving notice to employees of the
age at which their employer could compel them to retire, so
that the employee could plan alternative financial
arrangements.2
Since enactment of the amendments, the Fifth,21 8 Seventh 219 and Ninth 220 Circuits have held that an involuntary
overturn the United Air Lines v. McMann decision that an employer lawfully could
compel the retirement of an employee if called for by a bona fide pension plan. However, Congress did not otherwise change the working of section 4(f)(2) as it applies to
employer observance of the terms of other bona fide benefit plans.
213. EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980).
214. Sexton v. Beatrice Foods, 630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
215. Prior to the 1978 amendments, section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA permitted an
employer to compel an employee's retirement if necessary to comply with the terms
of a bona fide seniority system or a bona fide employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 623
(0(2) (1976).
216. Neither court decided whether the terms of the plan must be written or
whether, instead, a practice of retiring employees at a certain age would meet the
exception. However, the Fourth Circuit indicated that a practice of retiring employees earlier than age sixty-five as stated in the written plan would not qualify for the
exception. EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980).
217. Sexton v. Beatrice Foods, 630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980).
218. Renaudin v. Gulf Oil Corp., 623 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980); Jensen v. Gulf Refining Co., 623 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
219. Gonsalves v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 687 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3789 (4/20/81); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d
490 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Seventh Circuit found this holding supported by the DOL's interpretation in
29 C.F.R. § 860.110, which since 1969 has read in part as follows:
Thus, the Act authorizes involuntary retirement irrespective of age, provided
that such retirement is pursuant to the terms of a retirement or pension plan
meeting the requirements of Section 4(0(2). The fact that an employer may
decide to permit certain employees to work beyond the age stipulated in the
formal retirement program does not, in and of itself, render an otherwise bona
fide plan invalid insofar as the exception provided in Section 4(f)(2) is
concerned.
Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d at 494-95.
The DOL did not change this regulation subsequent to the 1978 amendments,
perhaps because the amendment prohibiting involuntary retirement of employees
pursuant to a benefit plan was effective with respect to employees aged sixty-five to
sixty-nine on January 1, 1979, but with respect to employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement in effect September 1, 1977, not until January 1, 1980 or the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, whichever was earlier.
220. Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1978).
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retirement pursuant to the terms of a benefit plan allowing an
employer the option to retire employees at a certain age meets
the requirements of section 4(f)(2). The Fifth Circuit reached
this result by finding that the presence of an option did not
establish that the plan was a subterfuge to evade the Act. The
Seventh Circuit held that the presence of such an option in a
benefit plan did not establish that the plan was not bona
fide.2 21 These decisions are consistent with cases decided by
the Third 222 and Sixth2 2 s Circuits before United Airlines v.
McMann 224 and the 1978 amendments. 225 If these holdings are
applicable to nonretirement benefit plans, they take a view of
such plans different from that of the EEOC and the DOL, for
they would permit an employer to reduce benefits if permitted rather than required by a benefit plan.22 6
Some lower courts have taken a different view of such
plans than the courts of appeals noted above. They would not
allow an employer to claim the protection of section 4(f)(2)
under a plan allowing an option to the employer.2 27 These
courts would presumably take the same view of nonretirement
benefit plans which permit an employer to reduce the benefits
provided for older employees.
Finally, the third element of a section 4(f)(2) exemption
requires that the benefit plan must not be a "subterfuge"
within the meaning of the section. To meet this requirement,
an employer must show that lower benefits for older employees are justified by age-related cost considerations. The interpretations set forth guidelines on the types of evidence which
an employer must present to establish such cost jus-

221. The Seventh Circuit decided that bona fide means genuine or authentic, i.e.,
the plan exists and it pays benefits. Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490, 494
(7th Cir. 1980).
222. Zinger v. Blanchett, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008
(1978).
223. Thompson v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1978).
224. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). See note 212 supra.
225. However, the DOL's regulations themselves apparently distinguished between retirement pursuant to bona fide plans, see notes 198-203 supra, and reduction
of benefits under a benefit plan.
226. See note 211 supra.
227. See, e.g., Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Hannan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Cowlishaw v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tification.2 2 8

Basically, in order to establish age-relatedness, an employer must present data showing the actual cost incurred in
providing a particular benefit. In the absence of such data, an
employer may rely on reasonable actuarial data on benefit
costs for similarly situated employees, if such reliance does
not result in significantly lower benefits for its employees.212 9
Cost comparisons and adjustments must be made on either
a benefit-by-benefit basis or on a benefit package basis.2 30
Under the benefit-by-benefit approach, higher health insurance costs for older employees cannot justify a decrease in any
benefit other than health insurance. The interpretations provide examples of the application of this approach to common
types of employee benefits plans, for example, life insurance,
long-term disability benefits and retirement
health 3insurance,
2 1
plans.
The more flexible approach, the benefit package approach,
allows an employer to make aggregate cost comparisons and
adjustments. A plan is within section 4(f)(2) only if the aggregate approach is not used to reduce the employer's cost of the
overall benefits or the favorability to the employees of overall
employee benefits for older employees.23 2 While this approach
is more flexible than the benefit-by-benefit approach, it is
subject to important limitations: the plan to which it is applied must fall within section 4(f)(2); 33 it is not applicable to
pension plans; 234 it cannot be used to justify reductions in
health benefits greater than that which would be justified
under the benefit-by-benefit approach; 3 5 a benefit reduction
exceeding that justified under the alternate approach must be
2 6 and the employer
offset by an increase in another benefit;
27
must verify all benefit reductions.
Cost comparisons and adjustments under both approaches
228.
229.
230.
231.

29
Id.
Id.
Id.

C.F.R. § 860.120(d) (1980).
§ 860.120(d)(1).
§ 860.120(d)(2).
§ 860.120(f)(1)(i)-(iv).

232. Id. § 860.120(d)(2)(ii).
233. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(i).
234. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii).
235. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(iii).
236. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(iv).
237. Id. § 860.120(f)(2)(v).
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may be made on the basis of age brackets of up to five years.
For example, if an employer provides life insurance benefits
until age sixty, benefits for employees between ages sixty and
sixty-five may be reduced only to the extent necessary to
achieve approximate cost equivalency with employees between
ages fifty-five and sixty. In addition, any reduction in benefit
levels for employees between ages sixty-five and seventy cannot exceed an amount which is proportional to the costs for
their coverage exceeding the cost for employees between the
ages sixty and sixty-five.238
Any benefit plan which requires individuals, on the basis
of their age, to make greater contributions to the plan than
younger employees in order to receive the same level of benefits, thus forcing a mandatory reduction in take-home pay, is
considered by the EEOC to be a subterfuge. However, older
employees may be given the option of making additional
contributions to receive the same benefits as younger
employees. 3 9
The EEOC interpretations, however, permit an employer
to coordinate its benefits with government benefits, even if
the availability of government benefits is based on age. Thus,
an employer may permit certain health benefits for older employees to be paid by Medicare rather than by the employer's
plan. However, an employer may do this only as long as the
amount expended for older employees and the benefits they
receive are not significantly less than expenditures and benefit
packages provided for younger employees in the regular
health plan. Health insurance coverage may be lawfully terminated when an employee reaches age seventy or when the employee is separated from his employer's service.240
The EEOC also permits employers to reduce life insurance
benefits for older employees if the reduction in any one year is
no greater than that justified by the increased cost of coverage
for an older employee's specific age bracket. The age brackets
used by an employer may not encompass more than five years.
Life insurance coverage may be terminated only when an employee reaches age seventy or when his employment status is
238. Id. § 860.120(d)(3).
239. Id. § 860.120(d)(4).
240. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii).
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terminated.241 In contrast, when a benefit-by-benefit analysis
is employed, a total denial of life insurance benefits for older
employees on the basis of age would not be justified.
Long-term disability benefits likewise may be reduced if
justified by age-related cost considerations. Complete cessation of such disability benefits, however, would be per se unlawful. The period of time over which such benefits are payable may nevertheless be limited if the termination date of the
period occurs no earlier than age sixty-five for disabilities
which occur at sixty years of age or before. Where a disability
occurs after age sixty, however, benefits under the disability
plan must be continued to age seventy.2 2 This results in employees disabled starting after age sixty being guaranteed a
longer benefit than employees disabled at age sixty or just
before. For example, an employee disabled at age fifty-nine
would be guaranteed benefits only for six years, until age
sixty-five, while an employee disabled at age sixty-one would
be guaranteed benefits for nine years, until age seventy.
The question whether section 4(f)(2) of the Act requires
employers to provide the same level of nonretirement benefits
for those employees ages sixty-five and over as for those employees under that age has not yet been considered by the
courts. However, the EEOC/DOL position, as found in the interpretive bulletin, undoubtedly will stimulate a spate of litigation, particularly with respect to whether a plan falls within
section 4(f)(2)'s language regarding "subterfuge."
While not specifically addressing the argument that a reduction of benefits constitutes a subterfuge to evade the Act
unless the reduction is justified by increased costs, the Supreme Court's decision in United Airlines v. McMann 243 casts
considerable doubt on the validity of the EEOC's position. In
McMann, the Court rejected a similar argument with respect
to the mandatory retirement issue. The Court held that section 4(f)(2)'s subterfuge requirement does not necessarily require an employer to demonstrate an economic or business
purpose in order to justify mandatory retirements pursuant to
bona fide preexisting plans.

241. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(i).
242. Id. § 860.120(f)(1)(iii).

243. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
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Another recent decision which affects this issue is the district court's decision in EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Association.244 Although this decision did not involve section 4(f)(2)
or a direct reduction in benefits, its rationale appears applicable to the EEOC's benefit package approach used in its interpretations. The court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring airline pilots in their age-sixty
retirement year24 5 to receive less favorable vacation benefits
than younger pilots, violated the ADEA's prohibition of discrimination with respect to a term of employment. The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the provision was unbiased since the older pilots' total benefit package was greater
than the benefits received by younger pilots, concluding that
age discrimination cannot be justified on the basis that some
other terms of employment grant older employees special benefits. This holding is clearly inapposite to the EEOC's use of
the benefit package approach.
While these two cases suggest that the EEOC's interpretations on this issue may not be glossed over by courts, one
point seems clear. The interpretations on this issue must be
considered a mere starting point for interpreting this new requirement of the ADEA.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1978 amendments to the ADEA have both procedurally and substantively increased its efficacy as a tool for eliminating age discrimination in the workplace. The procedural
changes, such as the charging requirement, the requirement of
prior filing with a state agency, the requirement of timely
filing and the conciliation requirement, clearly delineate the
steps necessary for filing suit under the Act. Further, the right
to a jury trial on any question of fact arising in regard to the
recovery of monies owed has been definitively established.
Substantively, the amendments have, of course, raised the
protected age limit from sixty-five years to seventy years, subject to the high policymaker and tenured employee exceptions. The question of retroactive application of the amend244. EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 489 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Minn. 1980).
245. Retirement of airline pilots at age sixty is required under FAA regulations,
14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980).
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ments has been addressed, with the EEOC favoring
retroactivity and the courts split on this issue. Finally, the effect of the increased protected age limit on any employer's
pension and benefit plans has been discussed at great length.
The interpretations in this controversial area must be considered merely as starting points in construing the new requirements of the ADEA. It is uncertain at this time what direction
resolution of this controversy will take.

